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ABSTRACT
Background and Aims The World Health Organization recommends increasing alcohol taxes as a ‘best-buy’ approach
to reducing alcohol consumption and improving population health. Alcohol may be taxed based on sales value, product
volume or alcohol content; however, duty structures and rates vary, both among countries and between beverage types.
From a public health perspective, the best duty structure links taxation level to alcohol content, keeps pace with inflation
and avoids substantial disparities between different beverage types. This data note compares current alcohol duty
structures and levels throughout the 28 European Union (EU) Member States and how these vary by alcohol content,
and also considers implications for public health.Design and Setting Descriptive analysis using administrative data, Eu-
ropean Union, July 2018. Measurements Beverage-specific alcohol duty rates per UK alcohol unit (8 g ethanol) in
pounds sterling at a range of different alcoholic strengths. Findings Only 50% of Member States levy any duty on wine
and several levy duty on spirits and beer at or close to the EU minimum level. There is at least a 10-fold difference in the
effective duty rate per unit between the highest- and lowest-duty countries for each beverage type. Duty rates for beer and
spirits stay constant with strength in the majority of countries, while rates for wine and cider generally fall as strength
increases. Duty rates are generally higher for spirits than other beverage types and are generally lowest in eastern
Europe and highest in Finland, Sweden, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Conclusions Different European Union
countries enact very different alcohol taxation policies, despite a partially restrictive legal framework. There is only limited
evidence that alcohol duties are designed to minimize public health harms by ensuring that drinks containing more alco-
hol are taxed at higher rates. Instead, tax rates appear to reflect national alcohol production and consumption patterns.
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INTRODUCTION
Controlling the price of alcohol, usually through taxation,
has long been established as an effective approach to ad-
dress the burden that alcohol places upon society, and it
is listed by the World Health Organization as a ‘best buy’
policy [1]. A public health perspective favours tax systems
under which tax increases as alcohol content increases
[2]. It is important to recognize that alcohol taxation acts
to raise revenue in addition to any public health purpose;
however, evidence shows that different systems of alcohol
taxation are not equally effective at reducing alcohol-
related harm and inequalities in that harm [3]. Additional
public health gains may be available by ensuring that tax-
ation reflects changes in the cost of living and by taxing the
strongest beverages (e.g. spirits) at higher rates, as they
allow larger quantities of alcohol to be consumed within
shorter time-scales and therefore are associated with
additional health risks. However, there is wide variation
internationally in both the scale and the structure of
alcohol taxation [2], with alcohol usually being taxed on
one or more of three different bases:
1 The volume of product (so-called unitary taxation);
2 The volume of alcohol contained in the product (specific
or volumetric taxation) and
3 The value of the product (ad-valorem taxation).
The European Union (EU) has a common legal frame-
work for alcohol duty which incorporates elements of all
of these approaches [4]. Spirits are required to be taxed
on a specific basis, as is beer, except in particular
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circumstances outlined below.Wine, sparklingwine, ‘other
fermented beverages’ (which includes cider) and ‘interme-
diate products’ (such as fortified wines, including sherry
and port) must be taxed on a unitary basis, not on their al-
cohol content. EU Member States are then free to levy ad-
ditional ad-valorem taxes on top of these duty rates
although, in practice, ad-valorem taxes affecting alcohol
are usually general sales taxes, rather than alcohol-specific
taxes. The levyingof duty itself on an ad-valorem basis is not
permitted.
Minimum duty rates are specified for beer, at £1.65 per
hectolitre per degree of alcohol (equivalent to £0.04 on
500 ml of 5% alcohol by volume (ABV) beer), and for
spirits, at £486.31 per hectolitre of ethanol (equivalent to
£1.95 on a 1-litre bottle of 40% ABV vodka) [5]. There is
no minimum duty rate for wine.
A small number of exceptions apply to these regula-
tions. First, beer with an alcoholic strength of 2.8% or
lower and wine with a strength of 8.5% or lower may be
subject to a reduced rate of duty. Secondly, a small number
of products produced in specific locations (such asMadeira)
are explicitly exempted from the prescribed minimum duty
rates. Finally, beer duty can be levied on the basis of either
the alcohol content itself or degrees Plato—a measure
based on sugar concentration prior to fermentation. If duty
is levied on the basis of degrees Plato then additional duty
bands are permitted, provided that these are nowider than
4 degrees Plato (approximately 1.6 percentage points
ABV), within which duty can be levied on either a specific
or unitary basis.
Within these parameters, the 28 current EU Member
States are at liberty to determine their own levels of alcohol
taxation. In this data note, we review the current levels
and structures of alcohol duty throughout the EU, how
the amount of tax paid varies with alcoholic strength and
considers the extent to which this variation aligns with a
public health perspective.
METHODS
Using publicly available data reported by every EU Member
State, including the United Kingdom [6], we converted al-
cohol duty rates effective on 1 July 2018 into the equiva-
lent duty payable in pounds sterling per unit of alcohol
(defined as 8 g, equivalent to 10 ml, of ethanol) at a range
of different alcoholic strengths (defined in terms of percent-
age ABV). Currency conversion was undertaken using
contemporaneous exchange rates included in the EU docu-
ment. We excluded general ad-valorem taxes affecting alco-
holic and non-alcoholic products, i.e. value-added tax
(VAT), which varies throughout the EU, from 17% in
Luxembourg to 27% in Hungary. Duty rates on beer de-
fined in terms of degrees Plato were converted to ABV
equivalents (1 degree Plato = 0.4% ABV) in line with the
EU’s own assumptions [6]. In order to assess whether dif-
ferences in tax rates reflect variation in the cost of living be-
tween Member States, we performed a secondary analysis
which accounted for differences in purchasing power using
purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates from the
World Bank [7].
RESULTS
Figure 1 illustrates the comparative duty rates for beer,
wine, sparkling wine, cider and spirits throughout the 28
EU Member States. Duty rates set to zero are not shown.
Supporting information, Figure S1 contains more detailed
graphs showing all beverage types for every Member State.
Three basic patterns are evident in the data. First, ow-
ing to the restrictions placed by the EU on duty structures,
duty rates on spirits and beer do not rise with strength (be-
yond a reduced rate for low-strength beer) and duty rates
for wine and cider actually fall with strength, although this
is mitigated to some extent by banded rates at lower
strengths. Secondly, some countries, particularly those in
eastern and southern Europe, set levels of taxation at or
close to the EU minimum levels. This is particularly com-
mon for wine, with only half of the 28 EU nations, predom-
inantly those in northern Europe, levying any form of duty
on wine. In contrast, only five countries set taxes at the
minimum level for beer and spirits. Thirdly, in the vast ma-
jority of countries, the effective duty per unit on spirits is
higher than on other beverage types. This differential is
particularly striking in Belgium and Sweden, where the
tax per unit levied on spirits is 5.7 and 2.6 times higher, re-
spectively, than the tax per unit on 12.5% wine.
Four Member States, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and the
United Kingdom, stand out as having generally higher
rates of taxation among all beverage types when compared
to other countries. In three of these—Finland, Sweden and
Ireland—banded rates of duty for wine and cider restrict
the tax rate per unit within a narrow range across the ma-
jority of the ABV spectrum, rather than allowing it to fall as
strength increases. This is in notable contrast to the other
higher tax country, the United Kingdom, where duty on
low-strength ciders at 3.5% ABV is £0.15 per unit, while
on ciders sold at 7.5% ABV it falls to £0.07 per unit. This
approach means that the United Kingdom also has a strik-
ingly large variation in its equivalent duty rates per unit for
cider, beer, wine and spirits which, at 7.5%ABV, are £0.07,
0.25, 0.50 and 0.37, respectively.
Figures 2 and 3 present the comparative duty levied
throughout the EU on a unit of alcohol in three common
products: 5.0% ABV beer, 12.5% ABV wine and 40.0%
ABV spirits. Finland has the highest rate of duty on 5.0%
beer, at £0.41/unit, while Spain, Luxembourg, Germany,
Romania and Bulgaria all use the EU minimum rate for
beer of £0.02/unit. Of the 14 EU countries who levy duty
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on wine, the effective rates for 12.5% still wine vary by a
factor of 100, from £0.003/unit in France to £0.39/unit
in Ireland. For spirits, only Bulgaria uses the EU minimum
duty rate of £0.06/unit, while Sweden has the highest rate
at £0.62/unit.
The impact of adjusting duty rates for purchasing
power is shown in Supporting information, Figs S2–S4.
The main difference is an increase in the relative rates of
alcohol taxation in eastern Europe, particularly in Greece,
Poland and the Baltic states. This adjustment arguably
Figure 2 Geographical distribution of alcohol duty rates per unit for selected products. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Figure 1 Alcohol duty rates for common products across all 28 EuropeanUnionMember States. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
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provides a clearer sense of the effective rates of alcohol
taxation relative to the incomes and living costs of citizens
residing within each country. However, freedom of move-
ment between EU countries means that caution must be
applied when interpreting the figures. For example, the
PPP-adjusted rates of duty in neighbouring countries,
Estonia and Finland, appear fairly similar (e.g. £0.42/unit
for spirits compared to £0.49/unit), but the absolute rate
of duty in Estonia is much lower (e.g. £0.29/unit for
spirits compared to £0.55/unit). This helps to explain
why approximately 20% of Finnish spirits consumption
originates from tourist imports, predominantly from
Estonia [8,9].
DISCUSSION
This analysis illustrates that, even within a prescribed
system of duty structures such as that mandated by the
EU, there can be substantial between-country variation in
the levels and structures of alcohol duty. From the perspec-
tive of public health, alcohol tax systems should broadly
seek to encourage consumption of lower, rather than
high-strength drinks, as this is likely to lead to reductions
in overall levels of alcohol consumption. In this context,
the EU-mandated approach of levying duty on wine and
cider on the basis of product volume, rather than
strength, may act against the interests of public health,
Figure 3 Alcohol duty rates per unit for selected products by region. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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potentially encouraging production and consumption of
higher strength products. This is exacerbated by the
fact that duty bands are not permitted for wine at
the strengths at which most wine is consumed (i.e.
above 8.5%).
In contrast, the specific taxation approach used for
both beer and spirits means that the tax payable on these
products is proportional to the alcohol content of the
product. A more progressive approach, however, would
levy higher taxes on stronger products. The only current
example of this is in the United Kingdom, which is
unique in having a higher specific duty rate for high-
strength beers and a lower rate for those at low strength.
This reflects a desire to encourage consumers to choose
lower-alcohol beers or to encourage producers to manu-
facture more low-strength products and reduce the
strength of existing products [10]. Three other countries,
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, use multiple duty
bands based on degrees Plato, which could potentially
be used for the same purpose; however, in practice the
rates of duty set mean that there is little variation in
effective duty rate per unit of alcohol throughout the
ABV spectrum.
As well as comparing duty rates across the ABV spec-
trum within drink types, it is also informative to consider
the relative levels of duty on different products. Typically,
spirits have a higher alcohol content than wine which is,
in turn, stronger than beer. In most countries, spirits are
taxed at a higher rate per unit than wine or beer, although
the extent of this gap varies widely, with Belgium in partic-
ular standing out as having markedly higher taxation on
spirits than other forms of alcohol. This is broadly in line
with public health interests, which may view high-
strength spirits as a particular concern as they allow the
consumption of a greater volume of alcohol in a shorter
space of time. Going against this approach, however, is
the fact that in all but six countries the duty rate on
12.5% ABV wine is lower than on 5.0% ABV beer. Finally,
while in many countries there are low or, in the case of
wine, zero rates of duty for some products, the United
Kingdom is unique in having generally high levels of
alcohol duty, with the exception of a single product, cider,
which is taxed at much lower rates. This disparity is likely
to be a key reason why cider consumption is particularly
high among heavy and dependent drinkers in the United
Kingdom [11–13].
An important limitation of this study is that we have
considered only alcohol duty rates, rather than the on-
the-shelf prices which are actually faced by consumers.
The production and distribution costs associated with
different types of alcohol may vary widely, and a truly
public health-orientated tax system should consider these
variations. For example, if the production and distribution
costs of a unit of alcohol in the form of spirits are vastly less
than the equivalent costs for a unit of alcohol as beer, then
the prices faced by consumers per unit of alcohol will be
also considerably less, all else being equal. This may, in
addition to concerns regarding harm potential, be a
compelling argument for setting different rates of specific
duty on different types of alcohol. We also do not examine
how taxation policies interact with, and perhaps justify,
other pricing policies. For example, differences in duty
structures are likely to impact upon the potential effective-
ness of pricing policies such as minimum unit pricing
(MUP). MUP imposes a floor price below which a unit of
alcohol cannot be sold while having no effect on prices
above this level, whereas tax affects the prices of all
products. MUP policies may therefore be more effective in
countries where some beverages have a lower effective
duty rate than others, as with cider in the United
Kingdom, than in countries where existing duty structures
already impose an effective minimum price in a practical
sense, if not a legal one. Understanding the extent to which
pricing policies and tax structures interact in this way is an
important field for future research.
It is likely that differences in tax rates in EU countries,
both across and within beverage types, are influenced by
a wide range of contemporary and historical factors. These
include the varying levels of production of different bever-
ages within countries, cultural differences in drink prefer-
ences, national wealth, political considerations, levels of
reliance by government on alcohol tax revenues, wider
alcohol policies and the public salience of alcohol prob-
lems [14,15]. Perhaps the clearest evidence of such factors
informing tax rates is that every EU country that produces
significant volumes of wine levies extremely low or zero
rates of duty onwine, while almost all non-wine-producing
countries levy higher rates. The United Kingdom’s low tax
rate on cider has also been shaped by local production.
Interestingly, the same does not appear to be true for beer,
with similar rates of beer duty in high-production
countries (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands) and lower-
production countries (e.g. Italy and France) [16]. These
discrepancies may be explained to some extent by the fact
that local duty is only levied on alcohol purchased within
the country and is not, therefore, applied to products
exported to other markets.
The analysis presented in this data note has shown that
alcohol duty rates and structures within the EU are not
currently well aligned with public health goals. On one
hand, the considerable scope for countries to set their
own duty rates leads to wide varieties in the extent to
which alcohol taxes protect public health across Europe.
On the other hand, the EU’s prohibition of taxing wine
and cider by alcoholic strength limits the ability of moti-
vated countries to introduce such public health-orientated
taxes. Addressing these weaknesses is a priority for future
EU-level alcohol policy.
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